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Note
Chan v. Korean Air Lines: The United
States Supreme Court "Shoots Down"
Notice Requirements under the Warsaw
Convention
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently decided a case that may
create legal turbulence for people traveling the international airways.'
1. Many air travelers would be surprised to learn that in the event of an air tragedy on
an international flight, the maximum dollar amount they could recover in most cases is limited
to $75,000. The limited recovery is imposed by an international treaty concerning international
airline flights which was geared toward an infant airline industry. See A. ToaorwsKI,
MONETARY LsrrArIONS OF LLr4airry IN Am LAW 237 (1986) [hereinafter ToBoawsmi]. See
also AIR TRANSPORT, 1988: THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. SCHEDULED AiRLINE INDUSTRY
1 (1988), which gives the current statistics on air travel. In 1987, 447,307 million passengers
flew the airways compared with 418,946 million passengers in 1986. The 1987 total is comprised
of 416 million passengers flying domestically within the United States, while 31 million
passengers embarked for international destinations, an increase over the 1986 figures of 394
million passengers flying domestically and 25 million passengers flying internationally. Id. at
3. See also U.S. DEPT. OF COmmERCE, BURAU OF THE CENSUS, NAT'L DATA BOOK & GUIDE
TO SotmcES, STATiSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrmD STATES 593 (1988) (noting that in 1986,
3,719 million total revenue miles were flown by the airlines, of which 3,318 million miles were
in domestic travel and 401 million were in international travel); Address by Eugene J.
McAllister, Asst. See. for Econ. and Bus. Aff., U. S. Dept. of St. (June 20, 1989), reprinted
by U.S. Dept. of St., Bureau of Pub. Aff., Off. of Pub. Comm., Editorial Div. (S. Haynes
ed. July 1989) (number of international passengers carried by U.S. airlines doubled in last
decade from 16 million to 32 million; U.S. air carriers control 52% of international market).
Cf. Cohen, Happy Birthday: Agreement C.A.B. 18900: A Critical View of the Montreal
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Chan v. Korean Air Lines [hereinafter Chan], necessitated interpre-
tation of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air, commonly called the Warsaw
Convention,3 in light of the Agreement Relating to Liability Limi-
tations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, known
as the Montreal Agreement. 4 While Warsaw has many provisions,
Chan involved only the notice requirements for passenger tickets. A
majority of the Court determined that notice of the Warsaw Con-
vention's applicability on a passenger ticket need not be given in the
ten point type size specified by the Montreal Agreement.' The Su-
preme Court decided that notice of Warsaw's application on the
passenger ticket is all that is required under the terms of the Con-
vention.
The Warsaw Convention is an interrlational treaty that has gov-
erned international air travel since 1933.6 The Convention affords
limited liability to international airlines that give notice on the
passenger ticket of Warsaw's applicability to the particular flight.
7 If
notice is not given, the airline can be held liable for claims in excess
of the Warsaw Convention's limitations.8
The Montreal Agreement, a special contract permitted under the
Warsaw Convention, increases the liability limitations under Warsaw. 9
The Montreal Agreement also specifies that notice of Warsaw's
Interim Agreement and the Authority for its Implementation, 7 Am L. 74, 76-77 (1982)
[hereinafter Cohen] (only 400 million passenger miles flown in foreign and domestic air travel
between 1925-1929; noting fatality rate of 45 deaths per 100 million passenger miles In 1970,
155 times that in 1929).
2. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
3. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 (1934), reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) (hereinafter Warsaw or Warsaw
Convention].
4. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18900, 44 C.A.B. 819 (1966), reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
5. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684.
6. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HAgv. L. REv. 497, 502 (1967) [hereinafter Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn] (substantial background
of Warsaw process). Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn are recognized as the preeminent authorities
on the historical background of the Warsaw system.
7. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
8. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 502.
9. Id. at 597 (detailed discussion of Montreal Agreement). See Warsaw Convention,
supra note 3, at art. 22(1), which provides: "Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and
the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Id. Cf. id. at art. 23, which provides:
"Any provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which
is laid down in this convention shall be null and void . . . ." Id.
1990 / Chan v. Korean Air Lines
application must be printed in ten-point type size.10 In Chan, Korean
Air Lines [hereinafter KAL] gave notice of the applicability of the
Warsaw Convention in eight-point type rather than the ten-point
required by the Montreal Agreement." With the increased volume of
international air travel, as well as the vulnerability of international
flights to terrorism, the likelihood of future air disasters is aggra-
vated; 12 an increase in litigation of the limited liability provisions is
inevitable. In the past, U.S. district courts have found the liability
limitations inapplicable when notice provisions have been inade-
quate." The Chan decision eliminates inadequate notice as a means
to avoid the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention.
4
This note will discuss the Chan case and its significance to inter-
national air travel. Part I discusses the historical background of
liability limitations in international air travel, including an analysis
of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement. Contained
within Part I is a discussion which highlights the relevant provisions
of both the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement, as
well as a comparison of the spectrum of interpretation given these
provisions by various U.S. Courts of Appeals. Part II analyzes the
Chan case, while Part III addresses the constitutionality of the
Warsaw Convention. Finally, Part IV discusses Chan's impact on
international air travel in the United States, including a survey of
the legal opinions surrounding liability limitations.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
From the time the Warsaw Convention was enacted,' 5 numerous
amendments, reflected by superseding protocols, have been adopted
in an effort to make recovery for damages incurred in an international
air disaster more equitable and generous for international air trav-
elers, particularly American passengers. 6 These amendments were the
10. See infra note 42 (Warsaw does not have a type size requirement).
11. Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1678 (1989).
12. See generally Recent Development, Aviation Law-Warsaw Convention Liability Prin-
ciples Extend to Damage From Terrorist Attack, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 600 (1976)
(discussing applicability of Warsaw Convention to hijacking and other terrorist activity).
13. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
14. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684.
15. The United States ratified the Warsaw Convention in 1934. See Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 6, at 502. The United States sent only an observer to the Convention and
did not actively participate in the treaty discussions. Id.
16. See generally id. at 501-05 (discussing American dissatisfaction with liability limita-
tions); Note, International Liability Limitation Agreements, 53 J. Am L. & Com. 839, 849-51
(1988) (discussing opposition to the liability limitations).
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Hague Protocol,1 7 the Guatemala City Protocol,'" and the Montreal
17. In an attempt to mollify critics of the low liability limitations in the Warsaw
Convention, various countries adopted the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept.
28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol]. The United States has never ratified
the Hague Protocol because it views the increased liability limits as insufficient. See Lowenfeld
& Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 546-52; Cohen, supra note 1, at 77. The United States did
not sign at the Hague Conference, but signed in 1956. Id. The purpose of the Hague Protocol
was to retain the unification established by the Warsaw Convention, while simultaneously
increasing Warsaw's liability limitations to $16,600, twice the amount allowed under the
Warsaw Convention. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 505, 546-52; Jeffrey, The
Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw
Convention, 48 J. Am L. & CoM. 805, 811 (1983) [hereinafter Jeffrey] (analysis of Hague
provisions). See also Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1691 n.14 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring)(if United
States had ratified Hague, issue before Court would be settled).
The Hague Protocol also amends Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention. See Hague Protocol,
supra, at art. 3, which states:
1. In respect of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be delivered containing:
a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
b) if the places of departure and destination are within the territory of a signing
Contracting Party, one or more agreed stopping places being within the territory of
another State, an indication of at least one such stopping place;
c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate
destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw
Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases
limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of
or damage to baggage.
2. The passenger ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of the conclusion and
conditions of the contract of carriage. The absence, irregularity or loss of the
passenger ticket does not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of
carriage which shall, none the less, be subject to the rules of this Convention.
Nevertheless, if, with the consent of the carrier, the passenger embarks without a
passenger ticket having been delivered, or if the ticket does not include the notice
required by paragraph 1 c) of this Article, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the provisions of Article 22.
1d. Cf. infra note 37 and accompanying text for discussion of Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention.
Article 3 of the Hague Protocol states that if a passenger ticket is delivered without notice
of Warsaw's applicability, the airline loses the liability protections. Warsaw's Article 3 differs
by providing loss of the liability protections only if a passenger ticket is not delivered. See id.
Although the Hague's notice requirement adds more substance to Warsaw's Article 3, the
Hague still does not address the adequacy of the notice.
Efforts to increase the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention have occurred at
other times. Chronologically, the Montreal Agreement, which did not amend the Warsaw
Convention, occurred next. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 552-75. See also
infra notes 38-44 for a discussion of the Montreal Agreement. However, even though the
Montreal Agreement interjected an increase in the liability limitations under Warsaw, subsequent
efforts continued in an attempt to reach a permanent solution to liability recoveries. These
efforts were the Guatemala City Protocol and the Montreal Protocols.
18. The first attempt to increase the liability limitations under Warsaw which occurred
after the Montreal Agreement came in 1971 with the Protocol to Amend the Convention of
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, as
amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague, Sept. 28, 1955, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971)
[hereinafter Guatemala City Protocol]. The United States has signed the Guatemala City
Protocol, but the U.S. Senate has not ratified it. See G. Ms.ER, LiABrrry iN INTERNATIONAL
Am TRANSPORT 161 (1977). [hereinafter M=R]. The United States Senate's reluctance to
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Protocols. 9 The amendments created a complex system of interna-
ratify the Guatemala City Protocol was once again based upon the low liability limitations.
See Comment, Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed
on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 Ca.-KENT L. Rav. 851, 853 n.19 (1978)
[hereinafter Comment, Aviation Law]. In order to become effective, the Guatemala City
Protocol expressly requires ratification by 30 states, of which the total air traffic of five
ratifying states must equal 40% of the total international air traffic. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7 n.7, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109
S. Ct. 1676 (1989). The United States has signed the Guatemala City Protocol, as well as the
Montreal Protocols, discussed below, but the United States Senate has not ratified either. See
Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 814. Article XX of the Guatemala City Protocol contains language
which implicitly references the United States:
This Protocol shall enter into force ... on the condition, however, that the total
international scheduled air traffic, expressed in passenger-kilometers, according to
the statistics for the year 1970 by the International Civil Aviation Organization, of
the airlines of five states which have ratified the Protocol, represents at least 400o
of the total international scheduled air traffic of the airlines of member States of
the International Civil Aviation Organization in that year ....
Guatemala City Protocol, supra, at art. XX. The Guatemala City Protocol increases Warsaw's
liability limitations to $100,000, with a shift from presumptive liability to strict liability against
the airlines. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 80-81. The distinction between presumptive and strict
liability centers around the total amount of liability which may be imposed upon an airline.
Under the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol and even the Montreal Agreement, airlines
are presumptively liable up to the amount listed in the respective document. However, airlines
could be liable for much more if the Warsaw Convention is not found to be applicable. The
Guatemala City Protocol would change the presumptive liability to strict liability, which means
that the most that an airline could be liable to any one passenger is the amount provided in
the Guatemala City Protocol, irrespective of whether the Warsaw Convention applies. Article
24 of the Guatemala City Protocol states:
In this carriage of passengers and baggage any action for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits of liability set out in this Convention,
... Such limits of liability constitute maximum limits and may not be exceeded
whatever the circumstances which give rise to the liability.
Guatemala City Protocol, supra, at art. 24. As a means to ensure that liability limitations
keep pace with changes in the world community, the Guatemala drafters have also provided
for periodic reassessments of the liability limitations. The Guatemala City Protocol amends
the Warsaw Convention to add an Article 42. Proposed Article 42 would state:
* Conferences of the Parties to the Protocol done at Guatemala City on the eight
of March 1971 shall be convened during the fifth and tenth years respectively after
the date of entry into force of the said Protocol for the purpose of reviewing the
limit established in Article 22, paragraph I a) of the Convention as amended by
that Protocol.
Id. at art. 42. Issues left unresolved by the Guatemala City Protocol soon prompted the
Montreal Protocols.
19. The third attempt to amend Warsaw's liability limitations arose in four separate
proposals known as the Montreal Protocols Numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4. See MLLER, supra note
18, at 37-38. Additional Protocol number 4 sought to simplify the documentation requirements
for cargo carriage which included an unbreakable liability limit for damaged baggage and was
not concerned with the carriage of passengers. Id. These protocols were signed by the
participating countries in 1975. Id. The United States did not ratify any of the Montreal
Protocols due to strong opposition from plaintiffs' attorneys and consumer groups who
advocated unlimited liability. See 129 CONG. REc. § 2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). See also
Mayne, Jr., Senate Rejects New Air Crash Liability Limits, 8 LmGATION NEws 3(3) (1978)
[hereinafter Mayne, Jr.] (Senate needed two-thirds majority vote to pass Montreal Protocols
since amendments to Warsaw Treaty); Current Development, The Montreal Protocols to the
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 3
tional air regulation which varies the amount of recovery for an
international air disaster depending upon whether the specific country
has ratified a particular protocol. 20 The United States has not adopted
any amendments to Warsaw and has agreed to only one special
contract, the Montreal Agreement. Thus, U.S. law pertaining to
international air carriage consists solely of the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Agreement.
The interpretation of these two documents has created confusion
among lower U.S. courts. 2' Since Warsaw itself does not have a type
Warsaw Convention on International Air Carriage by Air, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 412 (1982)
[hereinafter Current Development, Montreal Protocols] (discussing Protocols and favorable
view taken by U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations). The Current Development was
written before the rejection of the Montreal Protocols by the full Senate in 1983. Montreal
Protocol numbers 1, 2, and 3 attempted to solve the inherent problems in the conversion of
the various signatory nations' national currencies to the liability limitations contained in the
Warsaw Convention and its progeny. See MELLER, supra note 18, at 37. Each additional
protocol articulated standards for the previous amendments: Additional Protocol number 1,
Warsaw Convention; Additional Protocol number 2, the amendment at the Hague; and
Additional Protocol number 3, the Guatemala City amendments. Additional Protocol Number
3 would have changed the settlement medium at the Warsaw Convention to newly created
Special Drawing Rights (SDR). SDR would replace the Warsaw Convention's gold standard
by creating a unit of account valued on the basis of five national currencies. Id. The Montreal
Protocols increased the maximum liability recovery to nearly $300,000, with unlimited reim-
bursement for medical expenses. See Current Development, Montreal Protocols, supra, at 413.
Further, the Protocols terminated the wilful misconduct exception provided in the Warsaw
Convention. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 25, 1, which states:
The carrier should not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage caused by his wilful misconduct
or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which
the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Id. One additional document in the international air carrier arena is the Convention Supple-
mentary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air Performed by A Person Other than the Contracting Party, June 15,
1964, 500 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter the Guadalajara Convention]. The Guadalajara Convention
covers situations where air carriage was performed by a person not a party to any of the
other carriage agreements. The United States is not a signatory. See MILER, supra note 18,
at 38.
These attempts to amend the Warsaw Convention have not met with much success in the
United States. The reluctance of the United States to ratify appears to be based upon the
general disapproval of restricting plaintiffs' recovery potential. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 6, at 504-05; Comment, Aviation Law, supra note 18; Current Development,
Montreal Protocols, supra. The most successful supplement to the Warsaw Convention's
liability limitations is the Montreal Agreement.
20. See TOBOLEWSKI, supra note 1, at 231-32 (noting system has become complicated,
complex and not fully understandable to traveling public). A "Protocol" is defined as the
"records or minutes of a diplomatic conference or congress that show officially the agreements
arrived at by the negotiators." WEBSTER's T~mn NEw INT'L DIcTIONARY 1824 (1st ed. 1961).
21. See Lisi v. Aiitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (citing no international authority for treaty
interpretation); In re New Orleans Air Crash, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Warsaw
Air Crash, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352
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size requirement, the lower courts have interpreted Warsaw's notice
requirement for passenger tickets to be consistent with notice in the
ten-point type as stipulated under the Montreal Agreement.22 This
section first discusses the relevant provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Next, it discusses the Montreal Agreement, concluding with a
survey of lower U.S. court positions regarding notice requirements
under Warsaw and the Montreal Agreement.
A. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention23 is a multilateral treaty24 governing in-
ternational air carriage.2 5 Warsaw limits the liability of international
air carriers to 125,000 poincare francs, the U.S. equivalent of $8,300,
per person, for any accidents or injuries that occur while enplaning,
deplaning or on-board an aircraft.26 Soon after Warsaw's inception,
the treaty's liability limits were recognized as inadequate.27 Upon
becoming a signatory to Warsaw, the United States initiated informal
discussions aimed at increasing Warsaw's liability limitations.U These
discussions resulted in various amendments to the Warsaw Conven-
tion.29
F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Manion v. Pan American World Airways, 55 N.Y.2d 398,
434 N.E.2d 1060, 55 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1982); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d
160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968). Cf, Ludecke
v. Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd., 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. 1979) (delivery of ticket all that is
required; no adequacy of notice standard). But see Coccia v. Turkish Airlines, 108 Foro It. I
1586 (Corte cost. 1985), reprinted and translated in 10 AiR L. 294 (1985) (striking down
liability limitations on personal injury and death as contrary to Italian Constitution).
22. The problem with this reasoning is that although the Warsaw Convention provides
the framework upon which the Montreal Agreement is built, the Montreal Agreement does
not amend Warsaw. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd,, 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1692 (1989) (Brennan,
J., concurring). See supra note 9 for a discussion of special contract.
23. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3. Cases involving the Warsaw Convention are
not uncommon. See Floyd v. Eastern Air Lines, 872 F.2d 1462 (lth Cir. 1989) (Article 17
of Warsaw Convention creates cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 1462 (7th Cir. 1989) (airline not liable
under Warsaw Convention for actions of Canadian police investigating bomb threat). See also
In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing wilful misconduct
under Warsaw Convention).
24. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 915 (5th ed. 1979) defines multilateral agreement as involving
many parties. In this context, the Warsaw Convention involves many nations.
25. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6 (in-depth analysis of Warsaw
and its progeny). The Warsaw Convention has 129 signatory countries. Cohen, supra note 1,
at 74 (citing 1981 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STAT TREATiEs FORCE 259).
26. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 499-500, Embarking refers to the
process of boarding an aircraft, while disembarking refers to the process of leaving the aircraft.
Id.
27. See id. at 504-05.
28. Id.
29. Id. See Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 810.
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1. Warsaw's Goals
The Warsaw Convention united the diverse nations linked together
by the new aviation industry. The Warsaw Convention had two main
goals: first, to establish uniform rules and regulations during the
infant years of international air travel;30 and second, to limit the
potential liability of fledgling airlines for accidents that occurred
while passengers embarked, disembarked or were on-board an air-
craft.31 In order to implement these goals, the drafters designed
Warsaw to regulate numerous facets of air travel, of which only
certain areas are relevant to this note.32
2. Convention Provisions Related to Passenger Tickets
The Warsaw Convention establishes a presumption of airline lia-
bility along with certain defenses which an airline may raise to rebut
the claim. 33 Pursuant to Article 17, the air carrier is responsible for
the death or wounding of a passenger if the injury occurs on-board
the aircraft or while a passenger embarks or disembarks from the
aircraft.3 4 Articles 20 and 21 specify defenses which an airline can
raise to a liability claim. Article 20 provides that a carrier is not
liable if the carrier's agents have taken all necessary measures to
avoid damage, while Article 21 permits the defense of contributory
negligence.3 - Despite the defenses that an airline might raise, lower
30. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 498-500, (international airlines served
to unite nations with diverse legal systems).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 4 (baggage checks), 5 (air way-
bills).
33. See supra note 18 (discussing presumptive liability).
34. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 17, which states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Id.
35. See id. at art. 20, 1, which states: "(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves
that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures" Id.; see also id. at art. 21 which provides:
"If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of
the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate
the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Id. But see id. at art. 25 which cancels the
Warsaw Convention's protections for wilful misconduct by the airline. Article 25 states:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the
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state and federal courts in the United States have frequently found
the defenses inapplicable and awarded damages in excess of the
liability limitations stipulated in Warsaw.
6
Under the Warsaw Convention, a passenger ticket must meet the
requirements specified in Article 3, the principle article at issue in
Chan. Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed upon stopping places, provided that the carrier
may reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity,
and that if he exercised that right, the alteration shall not have the
effect of depriving the transportation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not effect the existence or the validity of the contract of transpor-
tation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this
convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts the passenger without
a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to
avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude
or limit his liability.
37
Article 3 is the only article in the Warsaw Convention that discusses
the requirements for passenger tickets.
Although the Warsaw Convention states that notice of Warsaw's
applicability must be given on the passenger ticket, it does not address
the language or format required for the notice. Refusal of the United
States to agree to any of the amendments to the Warsaw Convention
led private air carriers to agree to an increase in the liability limita-
tions through the Montreal Agreement.
B. Montreal Agreement
Frustration with the low liability limitations provided in the War-
saw Convention and the inability to reach agreement on recovery
court to which this case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions,
if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier
acting within the scope of his employment.
Id.
36. See supra note 21 (examples where lower courts have liberally interpreted the treaty).
37. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3.
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amounts acceptable to the United States caused the United States to
give notice of its intention to denounce the Warsaw Convention. 8
In order to prevent the U.S. denunciation, international air carriers
agreed to the Montreal Agreement as an interim accord effective
until an acceptable amendment to Warsaw could be reached.19 The
Agreement is a special contract between individual airline companies
and the United States government; it is sanctioned under the Warsaw
Convention and increases Warsaw's liability limitations to either
$75,000, inclusive of legal fees and costs, or to $58,000, exclusive of
legal fees and costs.4 The U.S. government requires acquiescence to
the Montreal Agreement as a prerequisite for an airline engaged in
international flight to land at or depart from U.S. airports.
4'
The Montreal Agreement embellishes otherwise ambiguous Warsaw
provisions. In addition to increasing the Warsaw Convention's lia-
bility limitations, the Agreement specifically requires that notice under
the Warsaw Convention contain particular language and be given in
ten-point modern type, in ink contrasting with the stock upon which
it is printed.42 While notice and required type size are important
38. See 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923 (1965); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 552.
See also DeVivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the Death Knell, 49 J. AIR L.
& Com. 71, 80-81 (1983) [hereinafter DeVivo] (discussing United States decision to denounce
the Warsaw Convention). Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention states:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by a
notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at
once inform the Government of each of the high Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denunciation,
and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded to denunci-
ation.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 39.
39. See supra note 4. See also Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 812-13 (discussing U.S. denun-
ciation and interim accord).
40. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 4, at 1 which states:
1. Each of the Carriers shall effective May 16, 1966, include the following in its
conditions of carriage, including tariffs embodying conditions of carriage, filed by
it with any government: ...
(1) The limit of liability for each passenger for death, wounding, or other bodily
injury shall be the sum of US $75,000 inclusive of legal fees and costs, except that,
in case of a claim brought in a State where provision is made for separate award
of legal fees and costs, the limit shall be the sum of $58,000 exclusive of legal fees
and costs.
Id.
41. See 14 C.F.R. § 213.7 (1989), stating: "It shall be a condition upon the holding of
a foreign air carrier or other authority authorizing direct foreign scheduled air transportation
that the holder have and maintain in effect and on file with the Board a signed counterpart
of C.A.B. Agreement 18900 .... " Id. See also Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 813 (discussing
liability provisions of Montreal Agreement),
42. Paragraph 2 of the Montreal Agreement states:
Each carrier shall at the time of delivery of the ticket, furnish to each passenger
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provisions under the Montreal Agreement, the increase in liability
limitations provided the primary impetus to its enactment. 43 Although
the Montreal Agreement is a special contract under Warsaw, lower
state and federal courts in the United States have interpreted Montreal
as amending Warsaw. 44 As the following section illustrates, the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals have inconsistently defined the effect of
the Montreal Agreement on notice requirements under the Warsaw
Convention.
C. Split Among the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Adequacy of notice requirements under the Warsaw Convention
had been considered by the U.S. Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
whose transportation is governed by the Convention, or the Convention as amended
by the Hague Protocol, and by the special contract described in paragraph 1, the
following notice, which shall be printed in type at least as large as 10-point modern
type and in ink contrasting with the stock on (i) each ticket; (ii) a piece of paper
either placed in the ticket envelope with the ticket or attached to the ticket; or (iii)
on the ticket envelope:...
Montreal Agreement, supra note 4, at 2.
The actual advice required by the Montreal Agreement reads:
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a stop in a country
other than the country of origin are advised that the provisions of a treaty known
as the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to the entire journey, including any
portion entirely within the country of origin or destination. For such passengers on
a journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United States of America,
the Convention and special contracts of carriage embodied in applicable tariffs
provide that the liability of certain (name of carrier) and certain other carriers parties
to such special contracts for death of or personal injury to passengers is limited in
most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $75,000 per passenger, and that
this liability up to such limit shall not depend on negligence on the part of the
carrier. For such passengers travelling by a carrier not a party to such special
contracts or on a journey not to, from, or having an agreed stopping place in the
United States of America, liability of the carrier for death or personal injury to
passengers is limited in most cases to approximately US $8,290 or US $16,580. The
names of Carriers parties to such special contracts are available at all ticket offices
of such carriers and may be examined on request. Additional protection can usually
be obtained by purchasing insurance from a private company. Such insurance is not
affected by any limitation of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Convention or
such special contracts of carriage. For further information please consult your airline
or insurance company representative.
Id.
Concurrently, United States law also requires that the notice be in 10-point type size. See
14 C.F.R. § 221.175a (1989), which states:
[.. W]hen the carrier elects to agree to a higher limit of liability to passengers
than that provided in Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, such a statement
shall be modified to reflect the higher limit. The statement prescribed herein shall
be printed in type at least as large as 10-point modern type and in ink contrasting
with the stock ....
Id.
43. See DeVivo, supra note 38, at 91.
44. See supra note 21 (for cases supporting cited proposition).
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prior to the Chan decision.45 The Second and the Fifth Circuits each
have deliberated adequacy of notice disputes and have interpreted
the Warsaw notice requirements as having been modified by Mon-
treal. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took an opposite position,
a position which has now been adopted by the United States Supreme
Court.46
In In re Air Crash at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980,47 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that adequate notice of the
liability limitation advice did not absolve the airlines of compliance
with the ten-point type size requirement of the Montreal Agreement.4 8
The court adopted a bright line ten-point type size standard, 49 finding
the ten-point type size guideline less arbitrary than deciding case by
case what constitutes adequate notice. Similarly, in In re Air Crash
Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982,50 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that "10 point type means exactly
that, 10 point type," 51 held that the defendant airline lost the limited
liability protection under Warsaw because the nine-point type size on
its ticket did not comply with Montreal's ten-point requirement.12
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals specifically considered and re-
jected the Second Circuit's view53 and held in In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of September 1, 1983,54 that the airline could still avail itself
of the liability limitations even though the advice notice was in eight-
point rather than ten-point type size.5 5 In order to resolve the split
among the circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in the Chan case.5 6
III. CEA v. KoREAN An LnEs
On April 18, 1989, with its decision of Chan v. Korean Air Lines,5 7
the United States Supreme Court resolved the split among the Circuit
45. Id.
46. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd. 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1684 (1989).
47. 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983), reh'g denied, 464 U.S.
978 (1983). See also Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968) (holding adequate notice required).
48. In re Warsaw Air Crash, 705 F.2d at 89.
49. Id.
50. 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 795 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1986), reinstated, 821
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987). The Court of Appeals adopted the District Court's opinion in full.
In re New Orleans Air Crash, 821 F.2d at 1173.
51. In re New Orleans Air Crash, 789 F.2d at 1098.
52. In re New Orleans Air Crash, 821 F.2d at 1171.
53. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
54. 664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd, 109
S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
55. 829 F.2d 1171, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
56. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1679 (1989).
57. 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
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Courts of Appeals. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, O'Connor and Kennedy, delivered the majority
opinion. The majority affirmed the decision of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that failure to provide
adequate notice is not sufficient to preclude the limitation of liability
protections provided by Warsaw. s Although concurring, Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens, asserted
the existence of an adequacy of notice standard under the Warsaw
Convention. 9
A. The Facts of the Case
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet Union fighter aircraft shot down
KAL Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan killing all 269 passengers on
board. 0 KAL Flight 007 was bound from Kennedy Airport in New
York to Seoul, South Korea.61 Since the flight originated at a U.S.
airport and was bound for an international destination, the flight
was subject to the provisions of both the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Agreement. 62 The plaintiff-appellants were the survivors
of the passengers killed on the flight. KAL, an international air
carrier, was the defendant-appellee.
B. Procedural Aspects
Wrongful death actions were filed in several district courts by the
survivors of the passengers killed on the flight. 63 The cases were
consolidated for pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407
and transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia. 4
58. Id. at 1684.
59. Id. at 1692 (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 1678. See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 1-10, 1983 (articles discussing the downing
of Flight 007).
61. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1678.
62. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text (discussing Warsaw Convention); supra
notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing Montreal Agreement).
63. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989). In all, 17
actions were filed: 11 in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, three in the Eastern
District of Michigan, two in the District for the District of Columbia, and one in the District
for Massachusetts.
64. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1678. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1989) concerns multidistrict litigation
and states in relevant part:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending
in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings ... transfers for such proceedings will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient
conduct of such actions.
Id.
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All parties stipulated that their rights were governed by the Warsaw
Convention. 6
5
In the trial court, plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment
based upon the fact that the issued passenger tickets had eight-point
type size rather than the ten-point type size required by the Montreal
Agreement. They argued that the type size discrepancy denied KAL
the benefits of the liability limitations offered by the Warsaw Con-
vention. 67 The District Court denied the summary judgment motion
because neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal Agreement
prescribed any sanction for failure to conform to the notice require-
ment. 68 The District Court judge certified the case for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 69 The appeal was taken on
the issue of whether the Warsaw Convention damage limitations were
applicable in light of defective notice under the Montreal Agreement.
70
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, adopting its
opinion in full.7' The United States Supreme Court, noting the
conflicting positions among the Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding
adequacy of notice requirements under the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Agreement, granted certiorari7 2 to resolve the circuit
split. 73
C. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court held that an international air carrier does not
lose the benefit of the damage limitations of the Warsaw Convention




69. Id. at 1679. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976 & Supp. 1989) states:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court
of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may, thereupon,
in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after entry of the order: Provided, however, that
application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Id.
70. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679.
71. Id. See also 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (adopting district court opinion in full).
72. 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
73. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679.
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by failing to provide ten-point type size notice of that limitation.
Conceding that the Montreal Agreement itself does not impose a
sanction for failure to comply with the type size requirement, the
plaintiffs [hereinafter petitioners] argued that the requirement is
created by reading the Montreal Agreement in conjunction with the
Warsaw Convention. 75 In this regard, the petitioners argued two
points: first, that Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention precluded the
limited liability protections if the air carrier failed to provide adequate
notice;76 and second, that the ten-point modern type, required by the
Montreal Agreement, is the standard for adequate notice under
Article 3 of Warsaw. 77 The Court rejected the first argument and
therefore, did not reach the second.
78
The Court noted that Article 3(1)(e) of the Warsaw Convention
requires notice of the liability limitations, but that Article 3 does not
impose any sanctions for failure to provide adequate notice. 9 The
only sanction specified is in Article 3(2), and provides that the air
carrier loses the liability limitations for nondelivery of a passenger
ticket. 0 The majority noted that some U.S. courts have equated
nondelivery of a passenger ticket with delivery of a passenger ticket
which lacks adequate notice; applying a literal interpretation of
Warsaw's language, the majority did not accept this equation.8'
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia looked at the plain language
of Article 3(2) and determined that in order to maintain the limited
liability protection, the airline need only deliver the ticket. 82 Justice
Scalia posits that Article 3(2) is clear: unless otherwise specified,
irregularity of notice does not prevent a document from being con-
sidered a passenger ticket and an irregularity does not eliminate the
contractual damage limitations provided in the Warsaw Convention.83
He continues by pointing out that the words "passenger ticket" in
the first sentence of Article 3(2), cannot be expanded to impliedly
include the requirements of the Warsaw Convention as set forth in
74. Id. at 1684.
75. Id. at 1679.
76. Id.
77. Id. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for the full text of Article 3 of the
Warsaw Convention.
78. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679.




83. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680-83.
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Article 3(l).84 According to Justice Scalia, since the language in the
second sentence of Article 3(2) begins with the word "[n]evertheless,"
the second sentence must limit the first sentence .8  Because the
language in the second sentence of Article 3(2) refers to nondelivery,
while the first sentence clearly states that there is no loss of liability
for an irregular document, the liability limitations of the Warsaw
Convention are not forfeited because of defective notice.16 Justice
Scalia concludes that a delivered document does not fail to qualify
as a passenger ticket simply because it is irregular.
8 7
The majority opinion further reasons that innumerable situations
could arise in which nondelivery or irregularity of a passenger doc-
ument is so egregious that the document could not be described as
a ticket.88 However, eight-point type instead of ten-point type was
not considered to be such a shortcoming. 9 Specifically, defective
delivery is quite different than no delivery at all. 90 Justice Scalia
bolstered his argument that defective delivery is different than no
delivery by comparing the language of Article 3(2), which covers
passenger tickets, with other Warsaw provisions, including Article 4,
84. Id. Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket
which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed upon stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the
right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercised that
right, the alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its
international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at art. 3(1).
85. Id. at art. 3(2). Article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention states:
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not effect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall nonetheless
be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts the
passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled
to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
Id.
86. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682-83.
87. Id. at 1684.
88. Id. at 1681.
89. Id. "Quite obviously, the use of 8-point type instead of 10-point type for the liability
limitation notice is not a shortcoming of such magnitude .... ." Id. See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia-
Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S.
455 (1968), in which the lower court judge characterized the notice provisions on a passenger
ticket given in 4-point type "as camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions
of Contract'." Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514.
90. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1683.
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pertaining to baggage checks, and Articles 8 and 9, concerning airway
bills. 91 He noted that these articles contain identical language provid-
ing that if the relevant document is not delivered, the air carrier
cannot avail itself of the liability limitations. 92
The Court points out that Warsaw's drafting history should be
consulted only to elucidate ambiguous text. The majority believes
the text of the Convention is clear, 93 as evidenced by the specific
language in Article 3, so that the drafting history need not be
consulted. 94 Furthermore, the Court cannot judicially amend the
treaty with language from the Montreal Agreement. 95 The majority
concluded that the Warsaw Convention treaty stands as written,
leaving any supplemental provisions to be added through international
negotiations, not by the American judiciary. 96
As an additional argument, the petitioners asserted that an absurd
conclusion would result if Warsaw mandated loss of the liability
limitations as a sanction for defective notice on baggage and air
freight, but not for personal injury or death.97 Justice Scalia rejects
this argument, stating that the result is not necessarily absurd. 9 In
order to show that the result was not absurd, he gives a quick
analysis of what the Warsaw drafters may have intended. 99 First, he
posits that one must consider, as far as baggage and air freight are
concerned, the level of liability in relation to the profits of the
carriage.'00 He explains that the drafters may have believed the $8,300
liability limitations were equitable as applied to passengers, so that
even if a passenger did not purchase added insurance, the recovery
would still be "fair." 101 In contrast, shippers misled by defective
notice would not be compensated fairly because the recoverable
amount was based upon an average value of goods which varies
considerably from article to article. 0 2 In sum, he reasons that a
91. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 4, 8, 9.
92. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682-83.
93. Id. at 1683-85. See also id. at 1686 (Brennan, J., concurring) (majority erred by
disregarding treaty hearings in their interpretation, noting majority's viewpoint finds no support
in historical minutes).
94. Id. at 1683.
95. Id. at 1684 n.5.
96. Id. at 1684 (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 71, 5 L. Ed. 191 (1821)).
97. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1683.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1683.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1683.
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passenger is likely to purchase personal insurance to cover the pos-
sibility of disaster, regardless of whether notice was given on the
ticket.
Second, Justice Scalia explains that liability limits on baggage and
freight under Warsaw are comparatively much lower than for per-
sonal injuiy and death. 103 Notice regarding the liability limits is
important to baggage shippers because they would recover less for
lost or damaged baggage. Third, and most significantly to Justice
Scalia, people are more likely to purchase additional flight insurance
to compensate for personal injury or death than for baggage.'04 Thus,
in the event of injury or death, passengers are likely to recover more
than the liability provision amounts from collateral sources, such as
flight insurance. These reasons give a plausible explanation for a
finding that the consequences of inadequate notice for baggage or
freight are distinguishable from inadequate notice to passengers.1"°
He stresses that the result produced by the text of the treaty is not
necessarily absurd, as the petitioners contend, nor can it be dismissed
as drafting error.' 6
D. The Concurrence
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, responds to what he
terms the majority's "self-affixed blindfold"' 0 7 by noting that the
petitioners' position has been accepted by virtually every court in the
United States that has considered it.01 In his opinion, the text of the
Warsaw Convention is susceptible to more than one plausible inter-
pretation and, therefore, recourse to the drafting history is useful.1' 9
According to Justice Brennan, by looking at the drafting history,
one could conclude that the document's actual words do not totally
reflect the drafters' intent." 0 Justice Brennan interprets the Warsaw





107. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684 (Brennan, J., concurring). When discussing the majority
decision not to adhere to the lower court opinions developed over the past years, Justice
Brennan stated: "It deserves at least to be stated in full, and to be considered without the
self-affixed blindfold that prevents the Court from examining anything beyond the treaty
language itself." Id.
108. Id. at 1684.
109. Id. at 1684-85 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1690.
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to "passenger ticket" in Article 3(2) is merely a shorthand term
incorporating all the particular requirements listed in Article 3(1).111
According to Justice Brennan, the meaning ascribed to Article 3(2)
does not have the meaning that the majority gives it.112 While Justice
Scalia reads the two sentences as separate, independent ideas,"3
Justice Brennan asserts that they incorporate each other, so that
Article 3(2) denies Warsaw's benefits where a passenger ticket does
not strictly comply with the notice requirements.
1 1 4
Furthermore, Justice Brennan states that Justice Scalia's interpre-
tation of Article 3 does not have any support in the drafting history.
1 1 5
Justice Brennan explains that, on the contrary, his own position has
extensive support in the Warsaw drafting history.11 6 He cites specific
language which shows that the drafters clearly intended the loss of
liability sanction to apply equally to passenger tickets, baggage and
air freight," 7 He concludes by stating that the Warsaw Convention's
drafting history indicates that loss of the liability protections for air
carriers who fail to give adequate notice on passenger tickets was
aimed at getting member nations to comply with the notice require-
ment. The drafting participants feared that otherwise the signatory
nations would not voluntarily comply," 8
Justice Brennan believes that since notice is required, it must meet
some minimal standard of adequacy." 9 Although he does not accept
the Second Circuit's bright line test, 20 Justice Brennan stops short
of defining adequate notice. The concurrence joined in the judgment
111, Id. at 1685-86,
112. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1685 (Brennan, J., concurring),
113. Id. at 1681 n.3, 1684 n.5, where the majority responds to the concurrence.
114. Id. at 1685 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 1686 n.5: "Without responding in detail to the literalist critique, I will say this:
,.. onv finds virtually no support for the Court's theory of what Article 3 means." Id.
116, Id. at 1686-87.
117, Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (Brennan, J., concurring), "[Tihe sanction for transporting
passengers without regular tickets is the same as that for the transportation for baggages and
for goods." Id, at 1687 (citing App. to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 73a,
92a). Justice Brennan also quotes the language of the drafters before the final document was
approved: "If . . the carrier accepts the traveler without having drawn up a passenger ticket,
or if the ticket does not contain the particulars indicated hereabove .... " Id, (emphasis in
original),
118. Id, at 1685. To support his argument, Justice Brennan gave an in depth analysis of
the positions various countries took during the negotiation phase at Warsaw. Id. at 1687-90.
However, Justice Brennan ultimately concluded that it is impossible to say what the drafters
at Warsaw intended: "IT]he record that has been preserved makes it impossible to say with
certainty what the treaty makers at Warsaw intended .... " Id. at 1690.
119. Id, at 1692.
120. Id. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text for the Second Circuit's bright line
test.
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because they agree with KAL, that if there is an adequacy of notice
requirement, the eight-point type used on KAL's passenger tickets is
adequate. 121
E. The Majority Responds to the Concurrence
While agreeing in the ultimate conclusion, the majority and con-
curring opinions reflect diametrically opposed positions in their anal-
yses of the notice requirements under the Warsaw Convention. Justice
Scalia gives Warsaw a literal interpretation, taking issue with the
concurrence's argument in two lengthy footnotes.'2 At the same
time, Justice Brennan may have been attempting to minimize or
narrow the majority's opinion, viewing the issue as more complex
than Justice Scalia is willing to admit. 2 1 Justice Brennan believes
that the interpretation of the treaty requires a more sophisticated
approach to judicial interpretation, and that the majority's plain
language method is too simplistic.
Justice Scalia, in a footnote, responds to Justice Brennan's inter-
pretation of Article 3.1 2Justice Scalia characterizes Justice Brennan's
first argument against the majority opinion as "nonsensical.' 1 25
Justice Brennan first argues that the "passenger ticket" language in
Article 3(2) is merely a shorthand reference incorporating the require-
ments of a passenger ticket set forth in Article 3(1).126 In Justice
Scalia's view, the two sections of Article 3 reference two distinct
ideas and should not be read together. Justice Scalia does not believe
that the drafters would have used a "shorthand reference" to another
provision in the same Article when they could have accomplished the
same purpose by using the language "such passenger ticket."' 2 7 Thus,
according to Justice Scalia the drafters could not have intended that
Article 3(2) incorporate the requirements of Article 3(1).128
In Justice Scalia's view, the concurrence's second argument against
the majority is flawed because it assumes the correctness of the
conjunctive reading of Article 3(1) and (2). 129 Justice Scalia maintains
121. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1693 (Brennan, J., concurring). "Here, however, the notice given
was surely 'adequate' under any conventional interpretation of that term." Id.
122. Id. at 1681 n.3, 1684 n.5, where the majority responds to the concurrence.
123. Id. at 1693 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 1681 n.3 (Scalia, J.).
125. Id.
126. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1685-86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 1681 n.3 (Scalia, J.).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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that Article 3(2) cannot possibly refer to Article 3(1), as the concur-
rence contends, because the second sentence in Article 3(2) begins
with "[n]evertheless," which sets forth an exception to the first
sentence of Article 3(2):
As written, the second sentence plainly conveys the meaning that if
the reason for the 'absence' of a passenger ticket [covered by the
first sentence] is that a passenger ticket was never delivered, the
carrier shall 'nevertheless'-despite the first sentence-be unable to
avail himself of the rules excluding or limiting liability. [emphasis
in original] 30
Justice Brennan, however, would read the two sentences as inclusive
of one another despite the "nevertheless" language contained in
Article 3(2).131
Justice Scalia continues his response to the concurrence by noting
that Justice Brennan, completing an analysis the majority declined
to make, concluded that the drafters' intention cannot be deter-
mined. 32 According to Justice Scalia, the finding that the drafters'
intention cannot be determined supports the majority position that
only the text of the treaty should be used to resolve the dispute.'
In addition, Justice Scalia states that Justice Brennan assumes an
adequacy of notice requirement under the Warsaw Convention "for
the sake of argument" because the lower courts have found one for
years.134 Justice Scalia explains that the Court's duty is to determine,
not to assume, the correctness of lower court decisions on statutory
or treaty interpretation matters.1 3- He ultimately concludes that had
the concurrence's viewpoint been adopted, the decision would have
been judicially inefficient because the concurrence never defines "ad-
equate.' ' 36 Therefore, unpersuaded by Justice Brennan's arguments,
Justice Scalia maintains his literal approach to interpreting the text
of the Warsaw Convention.
130. Id.
131. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1685-86 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 1684 n.5 (Scalia, J.). "It is interesting, therefore, that the concurrence, after
performing the examination we consider inappropriate, concludes that it is 'impossible to say
with certainty what the treaty makers at Warsaw intended."' Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. "In its last four pages, the concurrence assumes for the sake of argument that
there is an 'adequate notice' requirement in the Warsaw Convention-an assumption that it
justifies by the fact that '[c]ourts in this country have generally read [such a] requirement into
the Warsaw Convention." Id.
135. Id. "Of course they have read in such a requirement, and of course determining the
validity of doing so-rather than assuming it-was the very reason we selected this case for
review." Id.
136. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684 n.5.
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F. Analysis of the Opinions
The results reached by the majority and concurrence in Chan
illustrate different perspectives on treaty interpretation. The majority
opinion indicates that judicial treaty making will no longer be tol-
erated when interpreting the Warsaw Convention, Rather, the exec-
utive and legislative branches must negotiate for any revisions deemed
necessary. The concurrence, however, draws upon the extensive draft-
ing history of the Warsaw Convention in order to create an equitable
solution for international air travelers who land at or depart from
U.S. airports. The analyses used by both Justices to reach their
respective conclusions, however, may have shortcomings.
Justice Scalia takes a simple, straightforward approach to the
analysis of an extremely important issue in U.S. aviation industry.
He gives a literal interpretation to the Warsaw Convention, stating
that the provisions could lead to no other conclusion than what is
indicated in the clear import of the treaty language:
We must thus be governed by the text-solemnly adopted by the
governments of many separate nations-whatever conclusions might
be drawn from the intricate drafting history that the petitioners and
the Solicitor General have brought to our attention. The latter may
of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous....
But where the text is clear, as it is here, we have no power to insert
an amendment. 3
7
Justice Scalia produces weak grounds to support his denial of the
petitioners' claim that "[i]t would be absurd ... for defective notice
to eliminate liability limits on baggage and air freight but not on
personal injury and death." 8 His analysis, which is not grounded
in either the treaty's drafting history or in prior case law, consists
of speculation as to what the drafters might have intended." 9 Justice
Scalia's speculations regarding the underlying intention of the drafters
places greater importance on baggage recovery than on the loss of
life or injury caused by airline mishaps. Such speculation is ineffectual
as a persuasive analytic device.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, recognizes the diverse ways
in which a complex world interacts, and uses a liberal treaty inter-
137. Id. at 1683-84.
138. Id. at 1683. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
139. Chan, 109 S. Ct, at 1683. "These estimations of what the drafters may have had In
mind are of course speculation ..... " Id.
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pretation method which relies on the treaty's drafting history. While
his drafting error argument is not entirely persuasive, it does represent
a sound analysis of the time and effort that went in to drafting the
treaty, a point which the majority chooses to ignore. Justice Bren-
nan's viewpoint is plausible given the extensive drafting history which
culminated in the final treaty.
Like Justice Scalia's approach, however, the approach used by
Justice Brennan is also puzzling. Brennan explains that the result the
majority called absurd-the loss of liability protections for baggage
and air freight but not for personal injury or death-is the exact
result intended by the Warsaw drafters prior to the final document
reaching the conference floor. 40 If the drafters had intended that the
document contain a loss of liability penalty for noncompliance with
the notice provisions of Article 3, they presumably would have
included that sanction in the finished document. Although the draft-
ers' intent may be relevant to explain ambiguous terms in the text,
their intent is not useful if the drafters failed to incorporate the
language, to which their historical intent refers, into the text of the
treaty.
Chan resolves the circuit split in favor of the position taken by
the D.C. Circuit: the Warsaw Convention does not eliminate the
limitation on damages for passenger injury or death as a sanction
for failure to provide adequate notice of that limitation.1 4' The
majority opinion, comprised of those Justices commonly referred to
as the "conservative block,' ' 42 makes unlikely the possibility that
future Warsaw Convention cases will be interpreted in other than a
literal manner. The Chan decision signals to the executive branch
that in order to rid international air travel of these low liability
limitations, the executive branch needs to negotiate directly with the
international community. The federal government can no longer look
to the courts to circumvent the Warsaw liability limitations. The
Chan case is a cohesive and definitive statement on the interpretation
of the Warsaw Convention in conjunction with the Montreal Agree-
ment. Since Chan suggests a rigid adherence to the Warsaw language,
litigators may want to attack the treaty on constitutional grounds as
a means to circumvent the liability limitations.
140. Id. at 1687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 1684.
142. See Howard, Living with the Warren Legacy, 75 A.B.A. J. 69 (1989).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
As an international treaty entered into by the United States, the
Warsaw Convention enjoys a presumption of constitutional validity;
the United States Supreme Court has never declared a treaty uncon-
stitutional. 43 Although cases raising constitutional challenges to the
Warsaw Convention are not uncommon in the lower courts, 4 the
U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on its constitutionality.' 45 Chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention might be
made under the Due Process Clause, 146 the Equal Protection Clause,
47
the Takings Clause,1  or under a right to travel analysis.Y9
Under a substantive due process analysis, one would argue that
liability limitations are economic regulations and are, therefore, not
a rational means to achieve a legitimate purpose. 5 0 Specifically, the
justifications for the Warsaw Convention have become outdated. The
argument would be that the regulation of international air travel
today bears no rational relationship15 1 to Warsaw's original purposes:
to protect the fledgling airline industry from exposure to unlimited
liability and to induce countries to adhere to uniform regulations
143. See Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 815-16.
144. Id. at 816-21. See also Comment, Warsaw Convention Limitations on Aircarrier
Liability: A Critical View, 17 INaR.-AM. L. Rnv. 577, 597-606 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Aircarrier Liability] (analyzing lower court cases raising constitutional issues in Warsaw
challenges).
145. See Comment, Aircarrier Liability, supra note 144, at 815; Kelso, Review of the
Supreme Court's 1988-89 Term and Preview of the 1989-90 Term for the Transnational
Practitioner, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 353 (1989). Petitioners did not raise any constitutional issues
in Chan. They instead argued two points: First, that Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention
removed the liability protections if the aircarrier failed to provide adequate notice of Warsaw's
applicability on its passenger tickets. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679. Second, that the Montreal
Agreement's 10-point type requirement is the standard for adequacy under Article 3. Id. The
majority answered the first argument in the negative, thereby making consideration of the
second unnecessary. Id.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. V, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... ." Id.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, "nor shall any State.. .deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. V, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." Id.
149. See Comment, Warsaw Convention Liability Limitations: Constitutional Issues, 6 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 896 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Constitutional Issues] (discussing
constitutional arguments against Warsaw Convention).
150. Id. at 914.
151. The rational relationship test dictates that an enactment stands if the means used to
accomplish a goal are rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives. See, e.g., Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas, Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (applying rational relationship test); U.S.
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (applying the rational relationship test with
a "bite").
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regarding international air travel. 52 An argument aimed at the first
purpose might succeed since airlines are now multibillion dollar
industries.5 3 The second argument, that of adherence to uniform
regulation, however, is likely to fail under a rational relationship
analysis. The government has a legitimate purpose in committing to
low liability limitations as a bargaining strategy to induce countries
to agree to uniform regulation. 54 A due process challenge to the
Warsaw Convention is not likely to succeed since one of the original
purposes-maintaining adherence to uniform regulation-of the War-
saw Convention undoubtedly remains valid today. 5
Under an equal protection analysis, all persons must be treated
alike under similar circumstances and conditions.'56 Thus, one could
argue hypothetically that two passengers sitting side by side on an
aircraft, one flying domestically, the other internationally, are not
treated the same in the event of disaster: the international traveler is
subject to limited recovery due to the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention, while the other may be entitled to unlimited recovery
under domestic laws.5 7 An equal protection challenge to the Warsaw
Convention may succeed if the liability limitations are found not to
be rationally related to a legitimate purpose.'58 One author suggests
that this argument, while strong on the merits, is not likely to prevail
given the current composition of the Court, in which the majority
does not protect individual rights over those of big business. 5 9 More
importantly, disparate treatment of the passengers will likely be found
rationally related to the United States' desire to provide uniformity
of regulations in international air travel. Thus, an equal protection
argument, while facially strong on its merits, will meet with ques-
tionable success.
Finally, claims arguing either a taking of property without just
compensation' 60 or an infringement on the right to travel are also
152. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
153. See Comment, Constitutional Issues, supra note 149, at 899. See also Note, Warsaw
Convention Limitation on Liability: The Need for Reform After Coccia v. Turkish Airlines,
11 FoRAn L. Rta. 132, 141-42 (1987). "Today, in contrast, assets of the larger airlines are
measured in billions of dollars a piece and full insurance coverage is available." Id.
154. See Comment, Constitutional Issues, supra note 149, at 900.
155. Id.
156. See Comment, Aircarrier Liability, supra note 144, at 604 (citing In re Air Crash in
Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Ninth Circuit rejected both economic
regulation and right to travel equal protection arguments. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Comment, Constitutional Issues, supra note 149, at 900.
159. See Comment, Aircarrier Liability, supra note 144, at 599.
160. See Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 821 ("claim" is property right requiring just compen-
sation within Fifth Amendment).
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likely to fail. The Warsaw Convention limits only the amount of
recovery; it does not bar claims for injury or damages. 16' Therefore,
a claim that the Convention takes away a property right is unfounded
under Warsaw because the right to recover limited compensation is
allowed. A right to travel challenge is also likely to fail. The liability
limits under Warsaw neither restrict the right to travel, nor penalize
international travelers; they simply protect airlines from unlimited
liability.162
Although the likelihood of prevailing on a constitutional challenge
to the Warsaw Convention is questionable given the current viability
of the treaty in the international community, 163 the constitutional
arguments are sound and should be briefed and properly brought
before the U.S. Supreme Court. The current composition of the
Court and the Chan decision make it unlikely that the Court will
find the liability limitation protections of the Warsaw Convention
unconstitutional. Perhaps the best recourse for passengers seeking
increased liability limitations is to resort to the executive or legislative
process to compel a change in the legal system.
V. A LooK TO Trm FUTuRE
The Chan case is significant because the decision comes at a time
when legal scholars have begun to predict the demise of the Warsaw
Convention.'" Since the Court has indicated that the Warsaw Con-
vention provisions no longer will be thwarted by active judicial
interpretation, these scholars will need to rethink their positions.165
The conservative majority' " of the Court will likely continue to take
a traditional approach to cases involving interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention and not succumb to pressure from the executive branch
to judicially alleviate the liability limits through the use of tangential
issues such as adequacy of notice.' 67 The United States government,
161. See Comment, Constitutional Issues, supra note 149, at 900.
162. Id. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1983) (international
travel found constitutionally protected fundamental right, however, effects of liability limita-
tions only incidental, shifting insurance costs, not preventing travel).
163. But see supra note 21 (foreign courts interpretation of Warsaw Convention).
164. See generally infra note 176 for alternatives to the Warsaw Convention system.
165. Id. See also Mayne, Jr., supra note 19 (commenting upon U.S. Senate's rejection of
Montreal Protocols).
166. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 21 listing lower courts that have interpreted the Warsaw Convention.
See also Johnson & Minch,, The Warsaw Convention Before the Supreme Court: Preserving
the Integrity of the System, 52 J. Am L. & CoM. 93, 93 (1986) [hereinafter Johnson & Minch]
(noting Supreme Court policy condemning judicial activism in treaty interpretation); Current
Development, Montreal Protocols, supra note 19 (Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan favored
Montreal Protocols).
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in an amicus brief for the Chan case, indicated that the longstanding
view of the executive branch is that adequate notice is a precondition
to enforcement of the Warsaw liability limitations. 6 8 This view is
reflected in the Montreal Agreement and U.S. law, which both specify
ten-point type size. 69 However, as the Chan majority explained,
Warsaw has no specific type size requirement. 70 Thus, even though
the United States government desires that adequate notice be required
under the Warsaw Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court will not
read an adequacy standard into the treaty, particularly where the
language of the treaty is clear and unambiguous.'7'
The Warsaw Convention and its progeny are in dire need of reform.
The Chan majority undoubtedly recognizes that the limited liability
afforded to international air carriers undermines the traditional ap-
proach to American tort liability."12 The Warsaw Convention liability
limitations are outdated and low compared to the multimillion dollar
settlements which American airlines pay after domestic disasters. 73
Although increasingly high damage awards by lower courts indicate
judicial reluctance to honor the Convention's liability limits, the
Supreme Court has in the recent past accepted more Warsaw cases
for review, and the Chan case foreshadows an end to the circum-
vention of the liability limitations by U.S. courts. 74 However, inher-
ent difficulty in reform lies in achieving equitable solutions for both
the airlines and their passengers. 75 Various legal scholars have pro-
168. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Chan
v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
169. See supra note 42.
170. See generally Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989) (discussing
notice requirements under Warsaw Convention).
171. Id. at 1683-84.
172. See Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 830; See also ToBoLEWsxi, supra note 1, at 231 (noting
maximum recovery under Convention does not fulfill needs of international community for
just compensation). But see Cohen, supra note 1, at 79-84 (current American thinking indicates
Americans want limited liability but not at current unconscionable levels).
173. See Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 815. See also ToBoLrwscI, supra note 1, at 235: "[Olne
cannot avoid the conclusion that the monetary limits as expressed by the Warsaw System, and
as applied today, are not adequate and are based on principles which are now outdated or
unacceptable." Id.
174. See Johnson & Minch, supra note 167, at 93 (noting increasing trend in Supreme
Court review of Warsaw cases). In the first 50 years following the passage of Warsaw, no
cases were decided. In the period until 1965, there are less than 12 federal appellate decisions.
Id. See also Mayne, Jr., supra note 19, at 20 (noting cases frequently settle for more than
$75,000 because courts tend to treat gross negligence as equivalent of wilful misconduct); Wall
St. J., Aug. 7, 1989, at B4, col, 1 (discussing case where federal district court awarded punitive
damages based on wilful misconduct finding of KAL in Flight 007 downing).
175. See Note, Proposed Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 57 IND. L.J. 297, 312 n,100,
313 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Proposed Revision] (referencing United States airlines competition
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posed alternatives to the Warsaw Convention. 7 6 While these propos-
als do not solve all the problems associated with the liability provisions
in international air transportation, and in fact may prove to be too
complicated 177 or ethnocentric, 78 they do reflect the frustration with
the current levels of compensation.
Most scholars, however, do not suggest complete abandonment of
the Warsaw Convention; 79 instead they discuss the necessity to
increase the liability limitations in order to provide uniform recoveries
among airline passengers.'80 These analyses do not address the issue
with governmental subsidized airlines of foreign nations). Further, the solution needs to consider
that many of the foreign airlines are owned by the national governments of their home states.
Id.
176. See TOBOLEWSKI, supra note 1, at 232, who suggests that liability ceilings should be
set at a maximum level based upon the total amount of insurance carried by a particular type
of aircraft. Id. See also Jacobs & Kiker, Accident Compensation for Airline Passengers: An
Economic Analysis of Liability Rules under the Warsaw Convention, 51 J. Am L. & Com.
589, 597-605 (1986) [hereinafter Jacobs & Kiker] (applying complicated algebraic formula
leading to target level of compensation based upon actual economic loss incurred by death or
injury; avoiding arbitrariness of maximum compensation provided by international agreements);
Note, Proposed Revision, supra note 175 (proposing adequate compensation for American
passengers under new tripartite system of recovery reflective of airline industry's financial
status).
177. See Jacobs & Kiker, supra note 176.
178. See Note, Proposed Revision, supra note 175.
179. But see Note, Torts-International Liability Limitation Agreements, 53 J. Am L. &
CoM. 839 (1988) (suggesting Warsaw is outdated and may need to be abandoned but aban-
donment is not within the province of the judiciary).
180. See Cohen, supra note 1; See also Dean, Jr., American Liability in International Air
Transportation: Time for a Change, 4 Am & SPACE LAw. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Dean, Jr.]
(calling for ratification of Montreal Protocols). See, e.g., Comment, Aviation Law: Attempts
to Circumvent the Limitations of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw
Convention, 54 Cm.-KNTrr L. REv. 851, 863-68 (1978), for arguments in favor and opposed
to the present system, ultimately concluding that "The government must feel compelled to
renounce the treaty and to seek a new protocol that is more evenly matched between the
competing interests of plaintiffs and the airlines." Id. at 866. See also Comment, Aviation
Law-Limitation of Liability of Airline Agents and Employees under the Warsaw Convention,
12 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 117 (1978) (discussing need to change liability limitations to a reasonable
level or to renounce treaty in its entirety, but Warsaw remains legally binding). See also the
following articles dealing with the Franklin Mint case: Note, Torts-Liability Limitations Under
the Warsaw Convention-Trans World Airways, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.C. 1776
(1984), 50 J. Am L. & CoM. 155 (1984) (recognizing Supreme Court disdain for low liability
limitations and calling upon executive branch to act to change them); Recent Development,
Aviation-Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, 7 FoenAm L.J. 592 (1984) (discussing
problems of continued adherence to treaty and calling for legislative revision of Convention
system); Recent Development, Aviation: Enforceability of Warsaw Convention Limits on
Liability in the U.S.-Franklin Mint v. TWA, 24 HItAv. INT'L L.J. 183 (1983) (suggesting
Supreme Court send message to legislature to revise treaty); Recent Development, Franklin
Mint Corporation v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: Limiting Air Carrier Liability Under the
Warsaw Convention, 11 SYRAcUsE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 651 (1984) (discussing continued viability
of Warsaw Convention after repeal of gold standard currency); Note, The Demise of the
Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention-An Unnecessary Fatality: Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 57 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 592 (1983) (recommending adoption
390
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of whether the Warsaw Convention has outlived its usefulness.181
Other scholars contend that U.S. credibility and influence abroad
would be adversely affected if the damage limitations are abandoned
or changed significantly. 1 2 Their opinions are based largely upon the
fact that most of the impetus for change to the current system is
due to U.S. dissatisfaction with the liability limitations as they
currently stand.' Since various amendments designed to increase the
liability limitations have failed to gain the requisite support for
passage in the Senate, the United States could be disadvantaged in
subsequent negotiations. 184 The time is ripe for the United States to
once again reconsider its membership in the Warsaw Convention as
it did when it gave notice of its intention to denounce membership
in 1966.185
Have the Warsaw Convention and its limited liability provisions
outlived their usefulness? At a minimum the liability limitations are
grossly inadequate in the modern, industrialized world. Conversely,
large damage awards, although expected by U.S. plaintiffs, may not
be in the best interest of lesser developed countries. Certainly the
Chan opinion will foster rejuvenated interest in this perplexing prob-
lem.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chan indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court, when interpreting
Warsaw Convention cases, will strictly apply its provisions, main-
taining adherence to the liability limitations found therein. No longer
will "loopholes," such as inadequate notice, be tolerated. In light
of Chan, those who believe that the judiciary is in the process of
dismantling Warsaw will need to rethink their positions. The Chan
of Special Drawing Rights to maintain continued adherence to Warsaw Convention); See also
Comment, Saks: A Clarification of the Warsaw Convention Passenger Liability Standards, 16
INTER.-Am. L. REv. 539 (1985) (noting Supreme Court considers Warsaw a viable treaty but
suggesting Congress might act since entirely new system needed for regulating air carrier
liability).
181. See generally supra note 180 for references to articles dealing with the cited proposition.
But see Jeffrey, supra note 17, at 806 n.3, (criticizing Warsaw's low liability limits); and at
830 (liability limits are an affront to full, adequate compensation and have outlived their
usefulness). In addition, airlines today are powerful, safe, stable and insurable. Id.
182. See Dean, Jr., supra note 180. See also Current Development, Montreal Protocols,
supra note 19 (indicating influence, authority and credibility of United States impaired in
future negotiations if Montreal Protocols rejected).
183. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 504-05.
184. See Dean, Jr., supra note 180, at 9 (stating denunciation would subject United States
to allegations it conducted its foreign policy in bad faith).
185. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 546-52.
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Court has signaled the end of the judicial activism that has permeated
the lower courts' interpretation of Warsaw cases. The United States
legislative and executive branches should accept the responsibility to
rectify inequities regarding air carrier liability by negotiating inter-
nationally to make the system just for all airline passengers. After
Chan, U.S. passengers traveling on international flights will not be
able to rely on the judiciary to override the Warsaw Convention and
award compensation which Americans consider reasonable for inju-
ries or damages that might occur.
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